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ABSTRACT
In climate ethics, there is a debate about how the carbon budget, in terms of 
emissions permits, should be divided between people. One popular proposal, 
sometimes called The Equal per Capita View, says that everyone should have an 
equal share of the available emissions permits. Several authors have objected to 
this view, arguing that: (i) the equal per capita view implies isolationism since it 
treats emissions permits in isolation from other considerations of justice such as 
development, poverty and trade; and (ii) isolationism is implausible since it 
yields a number of problematic implications; therefore (iii) the equal per capita 
view is implausible. I examine this argument against the equal per capita view 
by scrutinizing the presumed problematic implications of isolationism. I show 
that they are either mistakenly inferred from isolationism or irrelevant as to 
whether isolationism is plausible or not. I conclude that the equal per capita 
view should not be discarded for being an isolationist approach. Rather, both 
isolationism and the equal per capita view should be considered as potential 
action guides. This result is of relevance to the climate political debate, since it 
could promote progress in the climate negotiations that are needed for limiting 
global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as set by the Paris Agreement.
KEYWORDS Isolationism; integrationism; emissions permits; emissions distribution; equal per capita; 
climate change
In the climate ethics literature, as well as in climate politics, there is a debate 
about how the atmosphere’s natural capacity to absorb greenhouse gases 
should be divided among people (see, e.g., Broome 2012, Gardiner et al. 
2010, Garvey 2008). In other words, this debate concerns the question of how 
to fairly distribute the amount of emissions that are compatible with climate 
stability. One of the major stumbling blocks in current climate policy is due 
to a disagreement on this issue. The political consequences of this debate in 
climate ethics are thus substantial.
Fundamentally, this debate concerns which principle for distribution of 
emissions permits is most plausible. Some ethicists – including Singer (2010), 
Attfield (2003), Jamieson (2005), and Broome (2012) – have proposed a so- 
called ‘Equal per Capita View’, according to which everyone should have an 
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equal per capita share of the atmospheric absorptive capacity, and thus an 
equal right to emit greenhouse gases.1 Others, however, have objected to the 
equal per capita view. One influential argument, presented in various ways 
by Posner and Weisbach (2010), Caney (2012), Margalioth and Rudich 
(2013), and Roser and Seidel (2017), goes as follows: 
(P1) The equal per capita view implies isolationism.
(P2) Isolationism is implausible.
Therefore,
(A) The equal per capita view is implausible. 
The argument for (P1) is that the equal per capita view treats emissions 
permits in isolation from other considerations of justice – such as trade, 
development, poverty, and health. This is uncontroversial, and thus I shall 
not discuss it further. The crucial premise is (P2), which will here be the main 
focus. The main argument for (P2) is that isolationism is supposed to yield 
a number of problematic implications:
(i) It disregards that emissions permits are substitutable,
(ii) It disregards that people have different needs,
(iii) It disregards differences in benefits and costs related to climate 
change mitigation,
(iv) It disregards issues of causal responsibility, and
(v) It makes the equal per capita view politically unfeasible.
Below, I examine these putative implications of isolationism for the equal per 
capita view. I show that they are either mistakenly inferred from isolationism 
or that they are irrelevant as to whether isolationism is plausible or not. 
Consequently, I argue, the equal per capita view cannot be discarded on the 
grounds that it is an isolationist approach. I start by clarifying the basics of 
isolationism and the equal per capita view, and explicate the environmental 
political stakes for this climate ethics debate.
1. The Basics of Isolationism and The Equal per Capita View
There is a fixed limit on the volume of greenhouse gases that the atmosphere 
can absorb before triggering dangerous climate change. This absorptive 
capacity of the atmosphere provides an ecosystem service that can be treated 
as a common global good. One of the debates in climate ethics concerns the 
question of how this absorptive capacity, in terms of emissions permits, 
should be divided between people. The equal per capita view is an answer 
to this question – it says that everyone has an equal right to emit. The 
intuition behind the equal per capita view is, to borrow Broome’s words, 
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that ‘[i]t seems obvious that no one in the world has a stronger claim to this 
resource [i.e. permits to emit greenhouse gas] than anyone else, so it should 
be divided equally between people’ (Broome 2012, p. 70).
Although climate ethicists are not basically interested in emissions per-
mits as such, but rather in the benefits that can be produced by emissions 
permits (e.g. capabilities or opportunities for wellbeing), the equal per capita 
view is not directly concerned with the distribution of such benefits. It is 
rather concerned with the distribution of one important resource – emis-
sions permits – considered as a means to such benefits. This is also what 
makes the equal per capita view an isolationist approach. To use Caney’s 
terminology, it treats climate responsibilities ‘. . . in isolation from considera-
tions about global and intergenerational justice in general (including issues 
such as trade, development, poverty, and health)’ (Caney 2012, p. 259). 
Isolationism (or the ‘Method of Isolation’, as he also labels it) thus stands 
in contrast to what he calls ‘integrationism’ (or the ‘Method of Integration’) 
which ‘. . . treats climatic responsibilities in light of a general account of 
global justice’ (2012, p. 259). This is also what makes it implausible according 
to the opponents of the equal per capita view.
Rival principles to the equal per capita view are typically integrationist 
rather than isolationist, since they propose that emissions permits are dis-
tributed in the light of other considerations of justice. For instance, the so- 
called ‘Grandfathering view’ takes reliance on emissions (depending on life-
styles, investments, plans and preferences for the future, etc.) as its main 
consideration, while the so-called ‘Subsistence view’ takes people’s needs as 
its main consideration.2 As this indicates, integrationism comes in degrees, 
since more or fewer considerations of justice could be included when 
determining the fair distribution of emissions permits.
This is also what makes the debate regarding isolationism and integra-
tionism interesting. For, if the opponents to isolationism are correct about its 
being implausible, then the principles that are isolationist, such as the equal 
per capita view, should plausibly be rejected in favor of some integrationist 
principle. But if isolationism can be defended, then these principles will not 
have to be rejected (at least not for the reason that they are isolationist). 
Moreover, since the equal per capita view is among the most popular 
principles in climate politics, this issue merits a careful examination.
This also unveils the climate political stakes for this climate ethics debate. 
Indeed, ethical distribution principles for emissions permits – such as the 
equal per capita view – fill an action-guiding function for climate politics. 
The direction in which further climate policies should be taken depends on 
which of these principles are most appropriate. Currently, the issue about 
how to distribute the burdens of climate change constitutes one of the major 
stumbling blocks in international climate politics. Broome (2012, p. 68), for 
instance, says that it is ‘the most hotly debated topic in all the politics of 
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climate change’. The fact that there is yet no agreement regarding which 
distribution principle is most plausible hinders further progress in climate 
negotiations. Making progress in this climate ethics debate is therefore 
central for achieving the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees 
Celsius, as set by the Paris Agreement.
Before undertaking an investigation of the debate concerning isolationism 
and integrationism, it is worth noting that it is not only integrationism that 
comes in degrees. As we shall see below, even isolationism can be understood 
in more or less inclusive terms. One reason is that it is an open question 
whether the equal per capita view takes into account past emissions. Roser 
and Seidel, for instance, claim that it ‘does not include historical emissions’ 
(Roser and Seidel 2017, p. 156). Caney, however, thinks there are two 
versions of the view with respect to past emissions: one history-sensitive 
(that takes them into account) and one history-insensitive (that does not). 
Although Caney aims to ‘criticize the principle at the heart of all of these 
versions of the equal per capita view’ (2012, p. 262), I will argue below that 
the history-sensitive version is not vulnerable to his objections, and that the 
history-sensitive version is more plausible than the history-insensitive 
version.
The equal per capita view can also be more or less isolationist depending 
on the extent to which it is compatible with other distributive tools – such as 
an emissions trading system, or supplementary principles dealing with other 
issues of justice. I will argue that the presumed repugnant implications of the 
equal per capita view can be inferred only given a too isolationist interpreta-
tion of the view.
I will now examine the objections to isolationism and, in effect, to the 
equal per capita view.
2. Isolationism Disregards that Emissions Permits are 
Substitutable
Caney (2012) argues that isolationism is implausible partly because it ignores 
that emissions permits are substitutable by other goods. He brings up two 
general challenges to the equal per capita view in this regard:
First General Challenge: If distributive justice is concerned with the fair share 
of a “total package” of goods, then we have no reason to endorse a principle 
that applies solely to one particular item, such as greenhouse gas emissions. If 
this is right then [. . .] it does not make sense to refer to the fair distribution of 
greenhouse gases. (2012, p. 271)
Second General Challenge: The equal per capita view’s focus on distributing 
permits to emit greenhouse gases is inappropriate because these permits are 
substitutable in a narrow sense. The specific goods that are associated with 
permits to emit greenhouse gases can be provided in other ways. Since this is 
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so, it is a mistake to claim that there is a principle of justice governing the 
distribution of rights to emit greenhouse gases [. . .]. (2012, p. 285)
The First General Challenge focuses on what Caney calls ‘Wide 
Substitutability’, which exploits ‘the possibility of some having fewer permits 
to emit greenhouse gases so long as they have a correspondingly greater share 
of other goods’ (2012, p. 283). For example, new technology is a wide 
substitute for oil since it could make an equal contribution (as the oil) to 
people’s well-being. The Second General Challenge focuses on what Caney 
calls ‘Narrow Substitutability’, which exploits the possibility that different 
goods may ‘possess the same kind of properties’ (2012, p. 285). For example, 
coal and gas are narrow substitutes for oil since they share the same kind of 
property (i.e. being fossil fuels) that makes them suitable for the same 
purposes (i.e. for energy production).
Together, these two challenges suggest that emissions permits are sub-
stitutable in both a wide and a narrow sense. That is, they do not belong to 
any specific category of non-substitutable goods, such as ‘sleep, food, water’ 
(2012, p. 274). Nor should emissions permits be treated with otherwise 
special concern, such as ‘the right to free speech and the right to freedom 
of conscience’, since it has no ‘special symbolic significance’ (2012, p. 274). 
However, since the equal per capita view treats emission permits as non- 
substitutable by other goods, Caney argues that the equal per capita view is 
implausible.
I have two points to bring up in response to this objection. First, emissions 
permits are not in general widely and narrowly substitutable. Although 
people’s non-subsistence emissions (i.e., emissions made to fulfill non-basic 
needs) are substitutable by other goods, people’s subsistence emissions (i.e., 
emissions made to fulfill basic needs) are not. It is impossible to live even 
a minimally decent life without emitting any greenhouse gases, since pro-
duction of food, commodities, transportation, and so on, yield emissions. In 
fact, it is impossible to even survive without emitting, since breathing and 
digesting give rise to emissions. If food, water and sleep should be considered 
non-substitutable for the reason that they are needed for human survival, 
then it seems that at least subsistence emissions should be so too – also 
because food production and water transportation require emissions.3
Perhaps one could question the relevance of the distinction between 
subsistence and non-subsistence emissions here. For one reason, the fulfill-
ment of basic needs, just as the fulfillment of non-basic needs, depends on 
the availability of so-called ‘satisfiers’. And the production of these satisfiers 
can be more or less emission-intensive, depending among other things on 
the technologies available. If there is a transformation to low-carbon econ-
omy, this will affect the substitutability of subsistence emissions. 
Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether technological changes and low-carbon 
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alternatives will sufficiently reduce the amount of emissions that are needed 
to satisfy our basic needs. Even if that eventually happens, it remains the case 
that subsistence emissions are not substitutable at present.
It is unclear what the implications of this point are. After all, opponents of 
isolationism might simply retreat to the slightly weaker position that emissions 
permits can often be substituted for other goods. Thus, they might argue that 
the fact that they cannot always be substituted means only that we should insist 
that any principle for the distribution of emissions permits must guarantee that 
each person has the right to emit a sufficient quantity of greenhouse gases, and 
not an equal right to emit. Still, my point here is not that emissions rights 
should be distributed equally just because they are not generally substitutable. 
Rather, my point is simply that the substitutability issue does not provide an 
argument against isolationism in the emissions distribution debate.
This leads to my second point. Even if we assume both that emissions 
permits are substitutable and that distributive justice is fundamentally con-
cerned with the fair share of a total package of goods, it does not follow that 
emissions permits should be distributed unequally in order to correct for 
existing inequalities between people. Interestingly, Posner and Weisbach, 
who also criticize isolationism, make a similar point: ‘A climate change treaty 
is not the only method of redistributing wealth and is unlikely to be the best 
way. If there are better ways of redistributing wealth, we should not use 
a climate treaty to do so’ (2010, p. 4).
The best way of making such redistributions depends, plausibly, on which 
goods produce the desired outcomes most efficiently. However, emissions 
permits seem not to be one of them. Using emissions permits as an equalizer 
would require a huge knowledge-gathering apparatus – not only regarding 
different people’s current packages of goods and their different needs but also 
regarding their different capacities to convert emissions to capabilities or 
opportunities for well-being (or whatever we care fundamentally about). 
A better candidate in this redistributive respect is money. Interestingly, 
Caney discusses money as a distributive resource on several occasions (e.g. 
2012, p. 281). But he does not say why we should not distribute emission 
permits equally and then use taxation (or similar methods) to deal with 
remaining inequalities. Nor do the other authors who charge the equal per 
capita view for treating emissions permits as non-substitutable. This empha-
sizes the political relevance of the distributive justice debate, since it makes 
clear that an isolationist treatment of emissions permits would actually be 
consistent with how other distributive issues are dealt with in real-world 
politics. I will get back to this in section 6, as it relates to a more general 
defense of isolationism and the equal per capita view. At any rate, the 
substitutability objection fails to establish that isolationism is implausible, 
just as it fails to show that the equal per capita view is flawed.
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3. Isolationism Disregards that People Have Different Needs
Another argument against the isolationist stance of the equal per capita 
view, provided by Caney (2012), Margalioth and Rudich (2013), and Roser 
and Seidel (2017), is that it fails to take into account people’s different 
needs. Since it only cares about an equal distribution of emissions permits, 
it fails to respect that some people are poorer than others, and thus need 
more emissions permits than others. Also, it appears to ignore the fact that 
developed countries (typically the rich) have already emitted a lot during 
their development, which developing countries (typically the poor) need 
yet to do.
However, it should be noted that if we accept the opponents’ claim that 
emissions permits are substitutable (as discussed in section 2), then we 
cannot conclude that the equal per capita view’s recommendations are unfair 
to those with greater needs. If what matters is people’s total package of goods, 
and if permits to emit greenhouse gasses are supposed to be substitutable by 
other goods, then an equal distribution of emissions permits does not imply 
that people have their needs satisfied to different degrees.4 There are other 
resources that can then be distributed in order to neutralize remaining 
inequalities.
Moreover, this objection seems to make sense only if an equal per capita 
distribution of emissions permits would in fact be insufficient for satisfying 
people’s needs. Whether or not such a distribution is insufficient in this 
respect depends on empirical matters that are not yet settled. Suffice it to say 
that if the world will be successful in the transition to more or less carbon- 
free societies (consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement), then this 
would not be unlikely. If the available carbon budget (i.e., atmospheric 
absorptive capacity) will thus be sufficient to fulfill everyone’s basic needs, 
then the intuition behind this charge against the equal per capita view loses 
its force.
A more important reply to this objection stems from the observation that 
the equal per capita view can be considered an history-sensitive approach. In 
Caney’s words, an history-sensitive version of the equal per capita view 
implies that ”current and future allocations of emission permits should 
take past emissions into account, holding that those with a history of higher 
than equal emissions should have fewer emissions in the future” (2012, 
p. 261). Given the unequal past emissions of different countries, the overall 
equal distribution suggested by a history-sensitive version implies that future 
emissions permits should not be distributed equally – at least until an 
equilibrium is reached. This has the effect that, to quote Broome, ‘[t]hose 
who have already taken up a lot of space by emitting greenhouse gas in the 
past will consequently receive fewer annual permits to emit in the future’ 
(2012, p. 70).
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Now, since the current differences in needs between people are closely 
connected to their respective countries’ development stage, which in turn is 
closely related to their historical emissions, the history-sensitive version of 
the equal per capita view will in fact account for this difference. Although it 
does not directly take into account people’s different needs, it does so 
indirectly.
So, once differences in historical emissions have been taken into account, 
the amount of emissions that poor countries are entitled to will (typically) 
exceed the amount that they are actually emitting. Bangladeshis, for instance, 
who presently emit around 0,5 tons per capita annually will not only be 
allowed to emit 0,5 tons more but also an additional amount as compensa-
tion for their historically low emissions. Since the number of emissions 
permits that they do not need to use themselves can be sold to other 
countries, the revenues could be used to satisfy the needs of the Bangladeshis.
Posner and Weisbach object that this reply fails since ‘some poor nations 
have very high per capita emissions. Many poor nations would be hurt, 
possibly severely’ (2010, p. 121). Similarly, Margalioth and Rudich say that 
‘there are many developing countries on the list of top emitters, especially if 
we take changes in land use into account’ (2013, p. 198). If they are right, it 
seems that even a history-sensitive version of the equal per capita view after 
all fails to take people’s needs into consideration.
That there are many developing countries on the list of top emitters, 
however, depends in part on an implausible way to count emissions: 
a production-based emissions accounting. On such an accounting, people 
are charged for emissions that are due to the goods they produce. However, 
a consumption-based accounting charges people for the emissions that are 
due to the goods they consume. Although a production-based accounting has 
previously been standard for practical reasons, a consumption-based 
accounting is by many people considered more just since it does not charge 
people in poor countries for the emissions that are due to their products that 
are in the end consumed by people in rich countries. And on a consumption- 
based emissions accounting, developing countries are not found on the list of 
top-emitters, since they typically do not consume all of what they produce 
but rather export it to developed countries (Duus-Otterström and Hjorthen 
2018).
Of course, there are problems with the consumption-based accounting 
too. For instance, it yields the counterintuitive implication that those who 
produce emissions bear no responsibility for the harmful effects of those 
emissions. Australia, for example, would not be charged at all for the 
emissions associated with its substantial coal exports. The same goes for 
oil-nations like Saudi-Arabia and Norway. Although this might sound 
counterintuitive, it is not the full picture. Australia, Saudi-Arabia, 
Norway, and any other net exporter of fossil fuels will indeed be charged 
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for the emissions that are due to the products they consume. It is just that 
they will not be charged for the emissions due to their exported products 
(coal and oil). Sure, one might still think that the most plausible emissions 
accounting is one on which responsibility for emissions is shared between 
producers and consumers (Lenzen et al, 2007). But, compared to the 
standard production-based accounting, such an accounting would still 
suffice to remove the poorest countries from the list of top emitters 
(Chancel and Piketty 2014).
Perhaps one could object that the history-sensitive version of the equal per 
capita view, on which my previous response relies, is implausible for ignoring 
the fact that justice is owed to particular individuals rather than to collectives 
of individuals. For example, the history-sensitive version of the equal per 
capita view implies that a present person in a Western (i.e., high-emitting) 
nation will get fewer emissions permits just because past people in that 
nation emitted more than their per capita share. Hence, the equal per capita 
view seems to disadvantage some particular persons (i.e., the present 
Westerners) for the harmful actions of other persons (i.e., the past 
Westerners), which may be regarded as unjust. This appears also to be the 
motivation of Roser and Seidel (2017, p. 156) for thinking that the most 
plausible version of the equal per capita view does not take into considera-
tion historical emissions.
However, this objection also presupposes a pure production-based emis-
sions accounting. For, the consumption-based accounting – or even 
a mixed accounting – can explain why present people in rich countries 
shall have fewer permits to emit than present people in poorer countries, 
while still focusing on particular individuals. This is due to the fact that 
present individuals in wealthy countries consume goods that their ances-
tors produced in the past. For example, most of the existing infrastructure 
in modern societies – including roads, health care and educational systems, 
high-technological equipment, and knowledge – are at least in part due to 
past productions of the industrialization. These productions involved emis-
sions. When present people now consume these resources, the consump-
tion-based accounting charges them for the emissions made in the 
production of these resources. Therefore, once we realize that the current 
production-based accounting is implausible, the individualist objection 
against the history-sensitive version of the equal per capita view is 
undermined.5
Indeed, the history-sensitive version of the equal per capita view is more 
plausible than a history-insensitive version of the view. Hence, although the 
equal per capita view is isolationist, it is not isolationist to the extent that it 
disregards historical emissions. Consequently, the problematic implications 
of such an extremely isolationist view cannot be taken for a general argument 
against the equal per capita view. Moreover, nothing prevents the equal per 
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capita view from being considered as a default position, where modifications 
could be made in order to deal with the fact that people have different needs. 
We shall return to this point in section 6.
4. Isolationism Disregards Benefits and Costs Related to Climate 
Change Mitigation
It has been argued that isolationism implies that the equal per capita view 
fails to take into account the fact that people will benefit to different extents 
from climate change mitigation, and have different costs for mitigating 
climate change. Starting with the benefits, Posner and Weisbach argue that
. . . the benefits of reducing emissions vary, depending on many factors, such as 
exposure to sea level rise or changes in weather patterns, dependence on 
agriculture, location of valuable mineral deposits, susceptibility to disease, 
and the likelihood of refugees from neighboring states. The net benefits 
under a per capita allocation, therefore, would not be equal. (2010, p. 125)
In a similar vein, Margalioth and Rudich argue that those who will benefit 
more from staying within the atmospheric absorptive limit should receive 
fewer permits to emit than those who will not benefit (as much) from 
mitigation. They conclude that ‘we must deviate from the equal per-capita 
principle, which is implicitly based on the assumption that all human beings 
benefit from climate change mitigation to the same extent’ (2013, p. 204).
It can be questioned, first of all, whether the equal per capita view is based 
on the assumption that all human beings benefit from climate change 
mitigation to the same extent. Also, given that the main contributors to 
climate change are people in the rich countries, while the main beneficiaries 
of climate change mitigation are people in the poorer countries, it is implau-
sible that those who benefit more from climate change mitigation should 
receive less emissions permits than those who benefit less from climate 
change mitigation. Moreover, it is not clear why people’s different benefits 
from mitigated climate change are at all relevant to the question regarding 
which principle for distribution of emissions permits is most plausible. I will 
get back to this shortly.
With regard to the different costs that people have for lowering their 
emissions to an equal per capita level, Margalioth and Rudich argue that 
people in Canada, for example, need more energy for heating due to the fact 
that it is colder in Canada than in many other countries. This means that 
climate change mitigation will imply higher costs for Canadians. They say:
We cannot seriously argue that all Canadians should leave Canada on a moral 
basis, because living there requires relatively high use of energy for heating 
purposes with the concomitantly high GHG [i.e. greenhouse gas] emissions 
per capita, and that if they choose to live there, they should pay a tax in the 
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form of having to buy emissions permits from people in other countries to 
maintain the same subsistence level; that is, to stay warm. (2013, p. 200-201)
Since something like this is what the equal per capita view would require, the 
equal per capita view appears to be implausible. Posner and Weisbach argue 
along the same lines. They think that ‘people who are most hurt by the 
abatement efforts mandated by the climate treaty should receive some kind 
of compensation’ (2010, p. 139).
In response to this objection it is worth emphasizing that, as Margalioth 
and Rudich indicate, the equal per capita view is compatible with a global 
emissions market where emissions permits can be traded between countries.6 
As this implies, those who need more than their equal per capita share of 
emissions permits can thus buy them from those who use less than their 
equal per capita share. Given that Canadians are relatively rich, and could 
thus afford buying permits from other countries where people are typically 
poor, it does not seem unfair of the equal per capita view to require that 
they do.
Some might want to object here that since not all people who live in 
rich countries are themselves rich (including Canadians), some poor 
people (including poor Canadians) will be required to take on heavy 
extra costs under an equal per capita principle, which is in itself unfair. 
However, this issue is one of distributive justice internal to individual 
countries (such as Canada), and ought not to be addressed at a global 
governmental level.
Furthermore, purchasing emissions permits is not the only alternative 
besides migration for Canadians (as a collective) if they want to emit within 
their equal per capita limit. First, they could decrease their own fossil-based 
consumption, and make their energy system more efficient or even fossil free 
(based on, e.g., nuclear, biofuels, solar, and wind). Second, they could take 
some of their emissions permits that they now spend on luxuries and spend 
them on subsistence needs – such as heating – instead. Third, they could 
make sure to offset their emissions, for instance through tree plantation or 
technology transfer to developing countries. I will return to the possibility of 
offsetting in section 6.
What is more, since most beneficiaries from climate change mitigation are 
poor, and since most costs for climate change mitigation will fall on the rich, 
emissions trading would even out some of the inequalities between the rich 
and the poor. Although the equal per capita view is isolationist, it is not 
isolationist to the extent that it does not allow for emissions trading. Once 
this observation is made, the intuition that isolationism is implausible for 
disregarding people’s different costs and benefits related to climate change 
withers.
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5. Isolationism Disregards Issues of Causal Responsibility
People in different countries have played different causal roles in the creation 
of climate change. Some objectors, for instance Roser and Seidel (2017, 
p. 154–155), have argued that this is something that an emissions distribu-
tion principle should consider and that the equal per capita view fails to do so 
due to its isolationist stance.
The main reason for thinking that the equal per capita view should be 
sensitive to people’s different contributions to climate change is that the 
question of emissions distribution has arisen because some people have 
overused the global carbon budget. Indeed, the future carbon budget is 
determined partly by people’s past emissions. So, one might think, the size 
of people’s future emissions permits should be influenced by the extent to 
which they have contributed to climate change.
However, this objection seems to conflate two different questions of 
justice in relation to climate change: one distributive question regarding 
how the greenhouse gas absorptive capacity of the atmosphere should be 
divided, and one corrective question regarding how the reparation costs 
for dealing with the effects of climate change should be divided. While 
the question of distributive justice is non-conditional in the sense that it 
concerns divisions of some initially available goods, the question of 
corrective justice is conditional in the sense that it concerns divisions of 
costs that stem from some previous activity (Vallentyne 2007, p. 549).
With this distinction in mind, it becomes clear that the equal per 
capita view is a principle of distributive justice: It is only designed to 
answer the question of what is the fair distribution of the atmosphere’s 
absorptive capacity. It is not designed to answer the question of what is 
the fair distribution of the costs for dealing with the problems that are 
due to an overuse of this capacity. The fact that people have contributed 
to different extents to climate change is relevant only to the question of 
corrective climate justice (see Vanderheiden 2008, Risse 2008).
Of course, if the equal per capita view were supposed to deal also with 
corrective climate justice, then its recommendation would be implausible. For, 
an equal per capita division of the climate costs would imply that poor people, 
who have in general not contributed to climate change, would have to pay for 
the climate costs caused by rich people. And this would be just as implausible as, 
for instance, allocating punishments equally among a state’s citizens irrespective 
of whether or not they had committed any crimes. But, again, the equal per 
capita view is not a corrective principle. This undermines the objection that it is 
implausible for disregarding issues of causal responsibility for climate change.
Still, one might think that the answers to questions of corrective justice 
influence the answers to questions of distributive justice, and that 
a distribution of emissions, permits should therefore take into consideration 
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the fact that people have played different causal roles in the creation of 
climate change. This seems to be what Roser and Seidel are after. They 
make a comparison with a lake that can cope with a limited number of 
bathing sessions per year, and the distribution of bathing permits to the 
townspeople. They say:
[T]here may have been differences in how the lake was used in the past that are 
relevant for allocating bathing rights. The fact that, on average, the lake can 
cope with “only” 2,000 bathing sessions per year may be a result of the fact that 
owners of the surrounding mansions regularly discharged their waste water 
into the lake, leading to an increase in phosphate concentrations. Should these 
individuals also receive the same usage rights as the townspeople who directed 
their waste water into the town’s septic tank? It would instead seem more just 
that the mansion dwellers should accept a small “deduction” [. . .] for their past 
use of the lake. (2017, p. 154)
For the ‘lake case’ to be analogous to the climate case, however the relevant 
currency would have to be amounts of phosphate emissions rather than 
number of bathing sessions. And with that in place, the counterintuitive 
implication can be produced only with a history-insensitive version of the 
equal per capita view. As was argued in section 3, the history-sensitive 
version is more plausible, and such a version implies that those who have 
emitted more phosphate/greenhouse gas in the past, and thus contributed 
more than others to the lake/climate problem, shall receive fewer emissions 
permits for the future. In the lake case, the mansion dwellers have in fact 
already consumed some of their per capita share – which those who directed 
their wastewater into the town’s septic tank have not.
This suggests that the intuition that underlies the objection at issue – i.e., 
that isolationism disregards issues related to causal responsibility – is 
already captured by the history-sensitive version of the equal per capita 
view. Taking people’s different causal contributions into account once 
again would be double-counting. Consequently, neither isolationism nor 
the equal per capita view is vulnerable to the objection from causal 
responsibility.
6. Isolationism Makes the Equal per Capita View Politically 
Unfeasible7
Some have argued that isolationism makes the equal per capita view politi-
cally unfeasible. Caney, for instance, argues that ‘[d]eveloping countries, in 
particular the so-called BASIC bloc (which comprises Brazil, South Africa, 
India, and China), are deeply opposed to an Isolationist approach. They 
argue that an equitable distribution of greenhouse gas emissions must take 
into account different countries’ needs’ (2012, p. 278–9). The idea is that 
developing nations will never agree to a climate treaty along the lines of the 
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equal per capita view – especially since the equal per capita view treats 
emissions in isolation from other distributive issues.
As we saw in section 3, a history-sensitive version of the equal per capita 
view manages to take people’s different needs into consideration. For this 
reason, Caney’s observation does not constitute an argument against the 
political feasibility of the equal per capita view. In connection to this, Posner 
and Weisbach raise a relevant question:
States have not so far shown any inclination to negotiate a multilateral foreign 
aid treaty. What reason is there to believe that they would be willing to do so in 
connection with a climate treaty? [. . .] Certainly, there is no ethical require-
ment to combine a climate treaty and a foreign aid treaty into one document. 
(2010, p. 86)
It seems that solving the problem of emissions distributions is easier when 
considered in isolation than when considered in conjunction with several 
other problems. The political community will, plausibly, have an easier time 
agreeing on one thing at a time than agreeing on all of them at once. Indeed, 
when deciding how to distribute emissions permits, it would be an over-
whelming task for COP negotiators if they had to take into account all 
considerations of justice.8 If the emissions permits were to be distributed 
in an integrationist manner (taking into consideration other issues of jus-
tice), then different countries would most likely have different opinions 
regarding which such considerations are relevant and how much they 
weigh in comparison to each other and in relation to the distribution of 
emissions’ permits.
Nevertheless, Margalioth and Rudich argue against the equal per capita 
view’s political feasibility from the other way around: That it will be rejected 
by rich nations. They say:
The equal per-capita principle would require developed countries to transfer 
hundreds of billions of dollars, possibly much more, to developing countries, 
compared to the status quo, because developed countries generally emit, on 
a per-capita basis, much more than developing countries do. Unfortunately, 
wealthy countries such the United States and Western European countries 
have looming budget deficits and an uncertain economic future; hence, 
requesting such amounts would doom the negotiations to failure. (2013, 
p. 194)9
I have two responses to this argument. First, as was argued in section 4, it is 
not the case that the equal per capita view requires high-emitting nations to 
transfer any money to low emitting nations. It only requires that each nation 
stick to what is consistent with an equal per capita share of emissions’ 
permits. One way to do so is to purchase emissions permits from poor 
countries, but another way would be for rich countries to develop their 
own infrastructures so that they become more or less carbon free – e.g. 
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through investing in domestic non-fossil-based energy. Yet another alter-
native would be for developed countries to transfer new technology to 
developing countries as a means of emissions offsetting. Thereby, a rich 
country could discount its own emissions in correspondence to the emis-
sions it helps other nations to reduce.
It may seem counterintuitive that countries which export a lot of clean 
technologies are thereby entitled to more emissions themselves. Moreover, it 
is not clear how to account for the value of technology transfer in terms of 
emission budgets. Note, though, that technology transfer – or any other 
means of emissions offsetting – must be additional in order to count. This 
means that the emissions reductions that one country undertakes as an effect 
of a technology transfer from another country can count as offsetting only to 
the extent the receiving country would not otherwise have conducted that 
emissions reduction. This also requires that the technology is transferred 
with less or no cost for the receiving country, since if the receiving country 
would have paid the full cost for it themselves, then it would not count as 
offsetting on part of the selling country.
In the present political context, moreover, offsetting is considered as an 
acceptable means to decrease (or even neutralize) emissions, and technology 
transfer (in the sense of installing solar panels, clean energy stoves, wind 
turbines, etc.) is considered as one acceptable way of offsetting. Hence, the 
equal per capita view will allow rich countries to undertake such means in 
order to stick to their allocated emissions budgets and so it will not force 
them to transfer hundreds of billions of dollars to poor countries. 
Consequently, the equal per capita view cannot be argued to be politically 
unfeasible on such a ground.
My second response to this objection is that the equal per capita view is at 
the moment a popular principle for the distribution of emissions permits. In 
Caney’s words, it is a ‘widely held’ and ‘perhaps, the dominant view among 
environmental philosophers and activists’ (2012, p. 259–60). The equal per 
capita view also seems to be the least bad alternative from the view of political 
feasibility. A principle that is more biased in favor of rich nations (such as the 
Grandfathering view) is even more likely to be rejected by poor nations, 
while a principle that is more biased in favor of poor countries (such as the 
Subsistence view) is even more likely to be rejected by rich nations. In that 
sense, Singer seems to be right that the equal per capita view comes out as 
a winner ‘because of its simplicity, hence its suitability as a political com-
promise’ (2010, p. 194). As Singer furthermore argues, the equal per capita 
view seems at the very least to be ‘a fair starting point’ (2010, p. 191). Again, 
this highlights the political implications of the climate ethics debate.
It could, however, be questioned whether this political feasibility debate is 
at all relevant as to which approach (i.e., isolationism or integrationism) is 
most plausible. In general, we do not think that the fact that it would be 
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complex or costly to apply some principle shows that that principle is false. 
Yet, it is a common thought in moral philosophy that the degree to which 
a normative principle is plausible depends not only on theoretical matters 
(regarding, e.g., fairness) but also on practical matters (regarding, e.g., 
political feasibility) (see, e.g., Timmons 2012, p. 12–16). The debate regard-
ing distribution principles for emissions permits centers around two related 
adequacy conditions: one about desirability, the other about achievability.10 
If it can be shown that some principles fare worse with respect to achiev-
ability, then this at least speaks against those principles. As this implies, it is 
not only the case that the ethical debate concerning the principles for 
emissions distributions is of importance for the understanding of the poli-
tical dimensions of international climate policies – it is also the case that the 
reality of environmental politics has implications for this ethical debate.
Relatedly, there is another more general defense of isolationism – which 
applies to several of the previous arguments as well. This general defense points 
out that the equal per capita view is not the one and only distribution principle. 
Obviously, there are other principles governing other policy domains, just as 
there are other principles for different climate-related issues. For instance, 
a polluter pays principle is often argued to be the most plausible corrective 
principle for dividing the costs for climate change mitigation and adaptation.
As this entails, the equal per capita view is a local rather than a global 
principle: It is not supposed to provide solutions to all the world’s problems; 
it is only supposed to provide recommendations for how to distribute 
emissions permits. For precisely this reason, the equal per capita view should 
be considered as one principle among other principles that deal with issues 
different from those regarding distributions of emissions permits. It is thus 
also open to the possibility of an overarching rectification principle whose 
purpose is to rectify misfortunes or inequalities that remain after all the local 
principles have been appropriately applied. This could be instantiated by 
a redistributive tax system, on top of the other distributive systems, whose 
aim would be to make sure that people would at the end of the day enjoy 
equal opportunities for wellbeing (or whatever other currency of justice we 
find relevant).
So, although the equal per capita view is isolationist, it is not isolationist to 
the extreme extent that it excludes the possibility of supplementary principles 
governing other domains than that regarding distributions of emissions 
permits. Once this is realized, it becomes clear that isolationism does not 
per se make the equal per capita view politically unfeasible.
7. Conclusion
I have responded to five objections levelled against isolationism and the 
equal per capita view: (i) Isolationism disregards that emissions permits are 
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substitutable; (ii) Isolationism disregards that people have different needs; 
(iii) Isolationism disregards that people get different benefits from, and costs 
for, mitigating climate change; (iv) Isolationism disregards that people bear 
different causal responsibilities for climate change; and (v) Isolationism 
makes the equal per capita view politically unfeasible.
Several of my answers to these objections depend on empirical matters. 
But, so do the objections against isolationism in the first place. As I have 
argued, it is far from obvious that isolationism makes an obstacle for the 
equal per capita view. Although I have not provided any conclusive argu-
ments that the equal per capita view is more plausible than its rivals, I have 
argued that the objections raised against isolationism do not manage to 
establish that it is implausible. Hence, both isolationism and the equal per 
capita view should be considered as potential guiding principles in the 
politics of climate change.
Notes
1. This view is sometimes also called ‘Emissions Egalitarianism’. See Roser and 
Seidel (2017), and Baatz & Ott (2017).
2. See Margalioth and Rudich (2013). For a defense of the Grandfathering view, 
see Bovens (2011). For a defense of the Subsistence view, see Shue (1993).
3. Perhaps only subsistence emissions are non-substitutable. But, if so, this holds 
also for food, water and sleep, since only subsistence-levels of these goods that 
are non-substitutable. For a discussion about subsistence emissions and non- 
subsistence (or ‘luxury’) emissions, see Shue (1993).
4. Caney is aware of this (2012, p. 291, fn. 85): ‘it is a mistake to criticize the equal 
per capita view on the grounds that it is unfair to those with greater needs: it 
depends on whether they have access to narrow substitutes’. Roser and Seidel 
(2017), however, seem to ignore this.
5. Perhaps one might question whether a consumption-based emissions account-
ing, which takes into account only the consumption of present people, is 
history-sensitive in any interesting sense. It should be noted, however, that 
the consumption-based emissions accounting does not discriminate between 
present or past people: It holds anyone (past, present, or future) accountable 
for the emissions that are due to the production of whatever they consume. In 
the present context, I focus on the consumption of present people since it has 
interesting implications for the objection that isolationism disregards people’s 
different needs. Moreover, the consumption-based accounting would be his-
tory-sensitive even if it focused only on present people’s consumption, in the 
sense that it would attribute responsibility for historical emissions proportion-
ally to the extent those emissions are causally tied to the production of the 
goods and services that present people consume.
6. In fact, the equal per capita view is supposed to be part of a so-called cap and 
trade solution to the climate problem, according to which climate stability is 
achieved by a three-step procedure: (i) an emissions cap for all countries 
together is first determined by international agreement, (ii) this emissions 
cap is then divided in terms of emissions permits between the individual 
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countries, and (iii) these emissions permits are then either used directly by 
each nation or sold to other nations. See Broome (2012, p. 68–69).
7. Some of the arguments in this section are drawn from Torpman (2019).
8. The COP (Conference of the Parties) is the supreme decision-making body of 
the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). 
All States that are Parties to this ‘Convention’ are represented at the COP. See: 
http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6383.php.
9. A similar argument is given by Posner and Weisbach: ‘Per capita allocations 
would have the effect of redistributing hundreds of billions of dollars from 
wealthy nations, above all the United States, to developing nations. For this 
reason, insistence on per capita allocations would effectively doom any climate 
change agreement’ (2010, p. 122).
10. Caney, for instance, says that a principle for emissions distribution should 
yield a recommendation that ‘is normatively compelling and that can be 
attained given the state of the natural world’ (2012, p. 295, my emphases).
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